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IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF UTAH 
STATE OF UTAH, 
Plaintiff-Appellee, 
v. 
STEVEN DOUGLAS THURMAN, 
Defendant-Appellant. 
Case No. 910494 
Category No. 11 
BRIEF OF APPELLEE 
JURISDICTION AND NATURE OF PROCEEDINGS 
This interlocutory appeal is from the trial court's 
denial of defendant's motion to suppress evidence seized in a 
search of a storage unit leased to defendant. 
The Court has jurisdiction to hear the appeal under 
Utah Code Ann. § 78-2-2(3)(h) (Supp. 1991). 
STATEMENT OF ISSUES PRESENTED ON APPEAL 
AND STANDARDS OF APPELLATE REVIEW 
The following issues are presented for review: 
1. Did the trial court correctly reject defendant's 
claim that the search warrant affidavit did not support the 
magistrate's determination of probable cause due to allegedly 
stale information? 
When a search warrant is challenged as having been 
issued without probable cause, the reviewing court does not 
conduct a de novo review of the magistrate's determination of 
probable cause; rather, the reviewing court simply looks to see 
whether the magistrate had a "substantial basis" for determining 
that probable cause existed. The reviewing court must pay great 
deference to the magistrate's decision. State v. Babbell, 770 
P.2d 987, 991 (Utah 1989). 
2. Did the trial court correctly rule admissible the 
evidence seized from defendant's storage unit pursuant to 
consents to a search of that unit given by defendant after police 
misconduct? 
Under State v. Arrovo, 796 P.2d 684 (Utah 1990), the 
state must show that a consent to search obtained after police 
misconduct was both voluntary and not a product of police 
exploitation of the prior illegality. The trial court's 
determinations on the issues of voluntariness and exploitation 
are findings of fact reviewed under a clearly erroneous standard. 
State v. Webb, 790 P.2d 65, 82 (Utah App. 1990); People v. 
Williams, 8 Cal.App.3d 44, 86 Cal.Rptr. 821, 824 (1970). 
CONSTITUTIONAL PROVISIONS, STATUTES AND RULES 
Any relevant text of constitutional provisions, 
statutes, or rules pertinent to the resolution of the issues 
presented on appeal is contained in the body of this brief. 
STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
Defendant was charged with first degree murder, a 
capital felony, under Utah Code Ann. § 76-5-202(1)(1) (Supp. 
1991); delivering an infernal machine, a second degree felony, 
under Utah Code Ann. § 76-10-307 (1990); and construction of an 
infernal machine, a third degree felony, under Utah Code Ann. 
S 76-10-308 (1990) (R. 7-9). 
Defendant filed a motion to suppress evidence, which 
2 
the trial court denied (R. 27-28, 67-81). This Court granted 
defendant's petition for permission to appeal the suppression 
ruling (R. 103). 
STATEMENT OF FACTS 
After hearing evidence on defendant's motion to 
suppress, the trial court made the following findings of fact1: 
The defendant is charged with a capital 
homicide and two related felonies. The 
Information alleges that defendant caused the 
death of Adam Cook by means of a bomb which 
was detonated on the night of May 15, 1991. 
On the night following the bombing incident, 
U.S. Magistrate Ronald Boyce issued a warrant 
to search defendant's apartment. The 
application for the search warrant requested 
authorization to enter defendant's apartment 
without giving notice ("no-knock•• entry) and 
at any time of the day or night. The warrant 
issued, however, restricted the search to the 
hours between 6:00 a.m. and 10:00 p.m. and 
did not authorize a "no-knock1' entry. 
The basis for the warrant was the 
affidavit of Roderic J. Conner, a Special 
Agent with the Bureau of Alcohol, Tobacco & 
Firearms ("ATF"). All the information 
contained in the affidavit appears to have 
been developed in the days and hours 
following the May 15 bombing. 
Assuming the accuracy of the Conner 
affidavit and the hearsay statements therein, 
the following facts supporting the issuance 
of the warrant were submitted to Magistrate 
1
 In his brief, defendant sets out a statement of facts 
drawn primarily from his independent reading of the transcript of 
the evidentiary hearing on his motion to suppress (Br. of 
Appellant at 2-5). However, because defendant does not challenge 
the trial court's findings of fact as clearly erroneous, see 
State v. Ashe, 745 P.2d 1255, 1258 (Utah 1987) (the factual 
findings underlying the trial court's ruling on a motion to 
suppress will not be disturbed on appeal unless they are clearly 
erroneous), the court's findings are the facts this Court must 
accept for purposes of review. 
3 
Boyce: A bomb was placed in an automobile 
belonging to Howard Cook and was detonated on 
May 15, 1991, injuring Mr. Cook's son, Adam. 
Mr. Cook had been having an affair with 
defendant's former wife, Wendy Thurman. The 
affair spanned the period before and after 
the Thurman divorce. As recent [sic] as May 
13, Cook had spent the night at Wendy 
Thurman's residence. The defendant was aware 
of the affair between Mr. Cook and his former 
wife. The defendant reported this affair to 
Mr. Cook's then wife and asked her if she 
intended to allow Mr. Cook to continue to 
reside in the Cook house. While defendant 
had made no threats directly to his former 
wife, on at least one occasion several months 
before the bombing incident he sat in his car 
in the early morning hours outside his former 
wife's apartment and observed his former wife 
and Mr. Cook returning from a date. 
Defendant had expressed his anger toward and 
hatred for his former wife and indicated he 
had hired a private investigator to watch her 
and Mr. Cook. On the morning of May 14, a 
male caller to Metz Bakery, an establishment 
where both Mr. Cook and defendant's former 
wife were employed, stated that there was a 
bomb in one of the trucks. The Salt Lake 
County Sheriff's Office investigated but 
found no bomb. On the day of the bombing, 
May 15, Mr. Cook's automobile was parked in 
the Metz Bakery parking lot from 6:00 a.m. to 
4:00 p.m. At the time of the bombing, Mr. 
Cook's automobile was parked in front of the 
Richard Craig residence located at 5740 South 
665 West in Murray. A neighbor of the 
Craig's observed a small two-door vehicle 
leave the area at a high rate of speed and 
with its lights out. The Affidavit does not, 
however, specify the date or time when the 
neighbor made this observation. The 
defendant drives a Chevrolet Monza. 
(Affidavit of Roderic J. Conner, paras. 2-4, 
6-10, 12). 
At 6:14 a.m. on May 17, 1991, the day 
following the issuance of the warrant and two 
days following the bombing, seven law 
enforcement officers executed the warrant. 
Six of the officers forced their way into 
defendant's apartment with weapons drawn less 
4 
than 30 seconds after knocking.2 The ATF 
agent in charge of entry testified that the 
officers announced their identity and intent 
simultaneously with their entry. Defendant 
was in bed, asleep, naked and offering no 
resistance when he was subdued and handcuffed 
by the officers. In the process, defendant 
was cut on the nose and attended to by 
paramedics on the scene. The evidence does 
not indicate whether the paramedics were 
summoned out of concern for the officers' 
liability or the defendant's well-being. The 
paramedics treated defendant and he was 
allowed to dress at some time before 7:30 
a.m. and perhaps as early as 6:30. Defendant 
was initially informed of his rights in 
accordance with the decision in Miranda v. 
Arizona, 384 U.S. 436 (1966) soon after the 
officers' entry but before he was treated by 
the paramedics and allowed to dress. 
At 7:30 a.m. defendant signed two consent 
forms granting consent to search two 
automobiles and a camper. ATF Agent Robert 
Swehla read the consent form verbatim to 
defendant. As the search at defendant's 
residence proceeded, the officers became 
aware of a storage unit which defendant 
rented. At 7:40 a.m. defendant signed 
another consent form authorizing a 
generalized search of the storage unit. 
Defendant fully understood the three consents 
before signing. His own testimony indicated 
that he was not compelled or coerced to sign. 
There is a conflict in the evidence whether 
an officer suggested that defendant's failure 
to cooperate and sign the consent would not 
ultimately prohibit a search. The court 
specifically finds that an officer made that 
2
 The court did not specify how many seconds, less than 
thirty, elapsed between the knock on the door and the entry. 
Agent Roderic Conner, who was not standing at the door when the 
entry was made but who heard the knock and entry from his 
position in the parking lot of defendant's residence, testified 
that the time between the entry and the knock on the door was 
M[h]alf a minute, maybe" (R. 141-42). He believed the occupant 
of the residence was afforded an opportunity to respond to the 
knock (R. 142). Conner gave the only testimony regarding the 
time period between the knock and the entry. 
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suggestion but that it was not Agent Swehla. 
It was Swehla, however, who was in charge of 
acquiring these consents. It should be noted 
that the consents were signed 75-85 minutes 
following entry and after defendant dressed, 
called his employer, was treated by the 
paramedics and informed of his constitutional 
right to counsel and right to remain silent. 
Between approximately 8:30 a.m. and 9:30 
a.m., an officer again informed defendant of 
his rights under the Miranda decision. At 
11:00 a.m. defendant accompanied the officers 
to the storage unit and defendant again 
signed a general consent to search the 
storage unit at 11:29 a.m. ATF Agent Conner 
went over the consent form with defendant 
point by point before he signed the form. 
Defendant understood the consent and 
testified himself that his signature was not 
coerced. He also understood that the form 
was similar to that which he previously 
signed for Agent Swehla. 
[T]he search of the storage unit proceeded 
at about 12:30 or 1:00 p.m 
Defendant was handcuffed throughout the 
various searches with the exception of a 
total of 20 minutes to one hour at the 
storage unit and in transit.3 Defendant was 
not formally arrested until 2:30 p.m. There 
can be no doubt, however, that defendant was 
in custody since 6:14 a.m. 
Memorandum Decision and Order (hereafter "Order") at 1-6 (R. 67-
72) (a copy of the court's entire decision is contained in 
Appendix A). 
Based on the foregoing factual findings, the court 
denied defendant's motion to suppress, holding first that certain 
information in the affidavit supporting the search warrant was 
not stale, and thus the warrant was properly issued upon the 
3
 Agent Conner testified that defendant was handcuffed for 
safety reasons only (R. 125, 130). 
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affidavit which, viewed in its entirety, established probable 
cause to believe relevant evidence was in defendant's apartment. 
However, the court ruled that the officers executed the warrant 
in violation of Utah Code Ann. § 77-23-10(1) (1990) when, without 
"no-knock" authorization, they "made a mere perfunctory knock and 
seconds later made a forced entry" and conducted a search. It 
then went on to hold that despite the officers' noncompliance 
with section 77-23-10(1), the evidence found in the storage unit 
was admissible as fruit of a search conducted pursuant to 
defendant's valid consent under State v. Arroyo, 796 P.2d 684 
(Utah 1990). Order at 7-13 (R. 73-79). 
SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT 
First, the trial court correctly concluded that the 
magistrate had a substantial basis for determining that probable 
cause existed for the issuance of the search warrant for 
defendant's residence. Contrary to defendant's contention, the 
affidavit was sufficient to establish probable cause and was not 
rendered inadequate due to allegedly stale information. 
Mere passage of time does not necessarily invalidate 
the basis for a warrant; rather, the affidavit must be read in a 
common sense fashion to assess whether the dated information 
still has the capacity to establish a fair probability that 
evidence of a crime would be found in a particular place. 
Here the information defendant challenges as stale, 
although dated, served to establish defendant's motive and 
opportunity to commit the bombing. Other challenged information 
7 
simply cannot be characterized as stale, in that it related to 
events close to or at the time of the bombing. 
Second, the trial court correctly ruled admissible the 
evidence seized from defendant's storage unit pursuant to his 
consent to a search of that unit. Contrary to defendant's 
argument, the record supports the court's determination that 
defendant's consents to the search were voluntary and not 
obtained by exploitation of prior police misconduct. 
Defendant fails to show that the trial court's factual 
findings of voluntary consent and no police exploitation are 
clearly erroneous. In reaching its findings, the court properly 
focused primarily on the voluntariness of defendant's consent in 
light of the prior police misconduct. This approach reflects the 
most reasonable interpretation of the two-part test adopted in 
State v. Arrovo, 796 P.2d 684 (Utah 1990). 
ARGUMENT 
POINT I 
THE TRIAL COURT CORRECTLY REJECTED 
DEFENDANT'S ALLEGATION THAT THE SEARCH 
WARRANT AFFIDAVIT CONTAINED FATALLY STALE 
INFORMATION, AND CORRECTLY CONCLUDED THAT THE 
MAGISTRATE HAD A SUBSTANTIAL BASIS FOR ITS 
DETERMINATION THAT PROBABLE CAUSE EXISTED. 
The trial court correctly concluded that the magistrate 
had a substantial basis for determining that probable cause 
existed for the issuance of the search warrant for defendant's 
residence. Contrary to defendant's contention, the affidavit was 
sufficient to establish probable cause, and was not rendered 
8 
inadequate due to allegedly stale information/ 
When a search warrant is challenged as having been 
issued without probable cause, the reviewing court does not 
conduct a de novo review of the magistrate's determination of 
probable cause; rather, to uphold the warrant, the reviewing 
court must simply conclude that the magistrate had a "substantial 
basis" for determining that probable cause existed. State v. 
Babbell, 770 P.2d 987, 991 (Utah 1989). In conducting its 
examination, the reviewing court "should consider a search 
warrant affidavit 'in its entirety and in a common-sense 
fashion.'" Ibid. (quoting State v. Anderson, 701 P.2d 1099, 1102 
(Utah 1985)). "Finally, the reviewing court should pay 'great 
deference' to the magistrate's decision." Ibid, (citing Illinois 
v. Gates, 462 U.S. 213, 236 (1983)). 
With respect to an allegation that a search warrant 
affidavit contains stale information, mere passage of time does 
not necessarily invalidate the basis for a warrant; rather, the 
affidavit must still be read in a common sense fashion to assess 
whether the dated information still has the capacity to establish 
a fair probability that evidence of a crime would be found in a 
particular place. See State v. Hansen, 732 P.2d 127, 131 (Utah 
A
 Defendant analyzes the issues raised on appeal solely 
under federal constitutional law; he does not treat them 
separately under article I, section 14 of the Utah Constitution. 
Therefore, the State will not address the question of whether the 
analysis would be different under the state constitution. See 
State v. Laffertv, 749 P.2d 1239, 1247 (Utah 1988) ("As a general 
rule, we will not engage in a state constitutional analysis 
unless an argument for different analyses under the state and 
federal constitutions are briefed."). 
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1987) (per curiam); State v. Stromberq, 783 P.2d 54, 57 (Utah 
App. 1989), cert, denied, 795 P.2d 1138 (Utah 1990). In short, 
H[t]he test for staleness of information contained in a search 
warrant affidavit is a common sense test of determining if the 
facts are sufficient to justify a conclusion by a neutral 
magistrate that the property sought is still on the person or 
premises to be searched." State v. Bohannon, 62 Wash.App. 462, 
814 P.2d 694, 698 (1991) (citations omitted). And, "'whether 
information is too stale to establish probable cause depends on 
the nature of the criminal activity, the length of the activity, 
and the nature of the property seized.'" United States v. 
Williams, 897 F.2d 1034, 1039 (10th Cir. 1990) (quoting United 
States v. Shomo, 786 F.2d 981, 984 (10th Cir. 1986)), cert. 
denied. 111 S. Ct. 2064 (1991). 
Defendant challenges as impermissibly stale the 
following information in the affidavit supporting the search 
warrant: (1) defendant hated the victim's father because he was 
having an extramarital affair with defendant's former wife before 
defendant and his former wife were divorced; (2) statements were 
made by defendant's former wife and her aunt regarding incidents 
with defendant which occurred several months before the 
bombing5; (3) a neighbor in the area of the bombing claimed to 
5
 Presumably, defendant is referring to the following two 
paragraphs in the affidavit: 
9. On May 16, 1991, Jeff Anderson and I 
interviewed Wendy Thurman [defendant's former 
wife]. She said that Steve [defendant] would 
not talk to her after the divorce and had not 
10 
have seen a small, two-door vehicle without its lights on speed 
away from the area; and (4) on May 14, 1991, a male called the 
victim's father's employer to say that a bomb was in one of the 
latter's trucks, but the police found no bomb. Br. of Appellant 
at 14-15. However, defendant fails to explain why this 
information was stale at the time it was submitted to the 
magistrate, or why the trial court was incorrect in concluding 
that "[m]erely because much of the information recited in the 
supporting affidavit disclosed matters occurring months before is 
of no great significance[;] [s]uch facts were for the purpose of 
showing that defendant had the motive and opportunity to commit 
the crime and that his apartment was thus an appropriate place to 
search," Order at 8 (R. 74). Defendant merely contends that the 
passage of time affected the vitality of the information. 
made any threats against her. Wendy said 
that she and Howard [the victim's father] 
came to her house at about 1:30 a.m. after a 
date several months ago and saw Steve Thurman 
in his car parked near the apartment watching 
them. . . • 
10. On May 16, 1991, Jeff Anderson and I 
interviewed Linda Mae Bird, the Aunt [sic] of 
Wendy Thurman, who said that she had received 
a telephone call from Steve Thurman about six 
months ago and he told her he had hired a 
private investigator to watch Howard and 
Wendy. Mrs. Bird said that Steve was 
extremely angry at Wendy because of the 
divorce and said that he hates Wendy for it. 
Mrs. Bird said that Steve knew where Howard 
parked his Landcruiser when he was visiting 
Wendy at her residence and he had photos of 
them together. 
Affidavit of Roderic J. Conner (State's Exhibit 1-S) (a copy of 
the entire affidavit is contained in Appendix B). 
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The information concerning events that had occurred 
months before the issuance of the warrant established that 
defendant was extremely angiry about the affair between his former 
wife and the victim's father, and that he had taken steps to 
monitor the relationship. No evidence was presented that 
defendant's anger had dissipated by the time the warrant was 
issued. Indeed, a common sense reading of the affidavit suggests 
defendant's continuing anger throughout the period leading up to 
the date of the bombing. Cf.. Hansen, 732 P.2d at 131 ("[A] 
common-sense reading of th[e] affidavit suggested the continuing 
nature of the drug's presence."). Thus, the trial court 
correctly concluded that the statements pertaining to defendant's 
mental state (i.e., those given by his former wife and her aunt) 
were not stale. The statements were relevant to establishing 
that defendant had the motive and opportunity to commit the 
bombing for a substantial period prior to its occurrence, and 
therefore contributed to the creation of probable cause to 
believe there was evidence of the crime at defendant's apartment. 
Although the statement in the affidavit that a neighbor 
in the area of the bombing had seen a small vehicle speed away 
without its lights on is not anchored with a specific date6, 
6
 The affidavit reads: 
12. On May 16, 1991, Detective Hall of 
Murray, Utah Police Department who [sic] told 
me that he interviewed Diane Burbidge who is 
a neighbor of the Craig's. She said that she 
saw a small 2 door vehicle leaving the area 
Eastbound [sic] at a high rate of speed with 
its lights out. 
12 
when read in a common sense fashion that statement obviously 
refers to the time of the bombing. Admittedly, this should have 
been clearly stated in the affidavit, but it was within the 
discretion of the magistrate to reasonably construe the ambiguous 
statement as referring to the time of the bombing. Babbell, 770 
P.2d at 992. See also State v. Anderton, 668 P.2d 1258, 1259-61 
(Utah 1983) (absence in affidavit of date of informant's 
observation and receipt of information not fatal; "affidavit in 
the instant case, couched as it is in present-tense language 
which describes on-going criminal activity, clearly refutes any 
contention that it is based on stale information"). 
Finally, the information regarding a bomb threat 
received by the victim's father's employer on May 14, 1991, just 
one day before the bombing and but two days before the warrant 
was issued, could not be considered stale. 
In sum, the trial court properly applied the highly 
deferential standards of review in examining the magistrate's 
determination of probable cause. It correctly rejected 
defendant's staleness argument in favor of the conclusion that 
the magistrate had a substantial basis for concluding that there 
was a fair probability evidence of the crime would be in 
defendant's apartment. The officers had a valid search warrant. 
Affidavit of Roderic J. Conner (State's Exhibit 1-S) (Appendix 
B). 
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POINT II 
THE TRIAL COURT PROPERLY APPLIED STATE V. 
ARROYO, 796 P.2D 684 (UTAH 1990), IN FINDING 
THAT DEFENDANT'S CONSENT TO A SEARCH OF HIS 
STORAGE UNIT, WHICH WAS RECEIVED AFTER POLICE 
MISCONDUCT, WAS VOLUNTARY AND NOT OBTAINED BY 
EXPLOITATION OF THE MISCONDUCT; ITS FINDINGS 
HAVE SUBSTANTIAL SUPPORT IN THE RECORD. 
The trial court correctly ruled admissible the evidence 
seized from defendant's storage unit pursuant to his consents to 
a search of the unit* Contrary to defendant's argument, the 
record supports the court's determination that defendant's 
consents to the search were voluntary and not obtained by 
exploitation of prior police misconduct. 
Having determined the officers had a valid warrant, the 
trial court then considered whether the execution of the warrant 
was lawful. It concluded that the officers' entry into 
defendant's residence, while authorized by the valid warrant, 
violated Utah's "knock-and-announce" statute, Utah Code Ann. § 
77-23-10 (1990). The court noted that under State v. Rowe, 806 
P.2d 730 (Utah App.) (holding that violation of Utah's nighttime 
search statute — Utah Code Ann. § 77-23-5(1) (1990) — requires 
suppression), cert, granted, 817 P.2d 327 (Utah 1991), the 
violation of section 77-23-10 would justify suppression of any 
evidence found in the search of the apartment. However, the 
court held that because no incriminating evidence was found 
there7, the unlawful entry need only be considered in deciding 
7
 Defendant contends that in reaching this conclusion, 
'[t]he court overlooked that a pay envelope to [defendant]'s 
storage unit was found." Br. of Appellant at 10. However, the 
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whether, under State v. Arroyo, 796 P.2d 684 (Utah 1990), it 
invalidated defendant's subsequent consents to the search of his 
storage unit, where all the incriminating evidence was found. 
Order at 9-10 (R. 75-76). 
Two issues should be addressed before examining the 
court's analysis of the consents under Arroyo: (1) In finding a 
violation of the knock-and-announce statute, did the trial court 
incorrectly hold that a near thirty second waiting period between 
notice and entry was not adequate? and (2) In order to resolve 
the issue presented on appeal, must this Court decide, as 
defendant seems to suggest, whether a violation of Utah's knock-
and-announce statute encompasses a fourth amendment violation or 
triggers the exclusionary rule? 
A. Violation of Section 77-23-10 
The officers did not have a "no-knock11 warrant under 
section 77-23-10(2). Order at 9 (R. 75). Thus, the issue is 
whether the officers complied with section 77-23-10(1), which 
provides that, in executing a search warrant, an officer may 
forcibly enter the premises "[i]f, after notice of authority and 
purpose, there is no response or he is not admitted with 
reasonable promptness."8 
court did not find that a pay envelope was discovered in the 
apartment search, and defendant fails to show that either the 
absence of such a finding or the entry of the finding that no 
incriminating evidence was found is clearly erroneous. See Ashe, 
745 P.2d at 1258. 
8
 Section 77-23-10 provides: 
When asearch warrant has been issued 
15 
In concluding that the officers violated section 77-23-
10(1), the trial court made two relevant factual findings: (1) 
the officers entered defendant's residence "less than 30 seconds 
after knocking," and (2) "the officers announced their identity 
and intent simultaneously with their entry." Order at 4, 9 (R. 
70, 75). In short, the court found that the officers knocked and 
then less than thirty seconds later entered, simultaneously 
announcing their authority and purpose. The court appears to 
have relied on these two factual findings as independent bases 
for its conclusion that section 77-23-10 was violated: (1) 
inadequate waiting period, and (2) improperly timed notice of 
authority and purpose. 
The court correctly concluded the officers violated the 
statute when they announced their identity and intent 
authorizing entry into any building, room, 
conveyance, compartment or other enclosure, 
the officer executing the warrant may use 
such force as is reasonably necessary to 
enter: 
(1) If, after notice of his 
authority and purpose, there is no 
response or he is not admitted with 
reasonable promptness; or 
(2) Without notice of his 
authority and purpose, if the 
magistrate issuing the warrant 
directs in the warrant that the 
officer need not give notice. The 
magistrate shall so direct only 
upon proof, under oath, that the 
object of the search may be quickly 
destroyed, disposed of, or 
secreted, or the physical harm may 
result to any person if notice were 
given. 
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simultaneously with entry, rather than before entry. The statute 
provides that entry is to occur only after an announcement of 
authority and purpose. See, e.g.. United States v. Dicesare, 765 
F.2d 890, 896 (9th Cir.) (announcing identity and purpose 
simultaneously with entry violates federal knock-and-announce 
statute), opinion amended, 777 F.2d 543 (9th Cir. 1985); State v. 
LaPonsie, 136 Ariz. 73, 664 P.2d 223 (Ariz. App. 1982) (virtually 
simultaneous announcement and entry not sufficient); State v. 
Lowrie, 12 Wash.App. 155, 528 P.2d 1010 (1974) (announcement 
while knocking door down insufficient).9 The officers' error 
was not egregious; they simply erred in the timing of the 
required notice, not in failing to give the notice altogether. 
Compare State v. Buck, 756 P.2d 700 (Utah 1988) (although 
officers violated statute by failing to knock or announce their 
9
 Although the officers may have been able to articulate a 
legitimate concern for their safety when entering defendant's 
apartment due to the violent nature of the crime they suspected 
he had recently committed, such that the failure to announce 
their authority and purpose before entry could be excused, see 
State v. Ford, 310 Or. 623, 638-39, 801 P.2d 754, 763-64 (1990), 
only Agent Conner testified about potential danger in making the 
entry, and then only in general terms (R. 142). A more 
specifically articulated concern is required. See United States 
v. Nabors, 901 F.2d 1351, 1354-55 (6th Cir. 1990) (mere fact 
defendant suspected of having a firearm would not be enough, but 
exigent circumstances existed here, based on suspicion of drug 
trafficking and probable cause defendant had an array of firearms 
and routinely wore a bullet-proof vest); State v. Pelletier, 209 
Conn. 564, 573-75, 552 A.2d 805, 810-11 (1989) (entry without 
notice proper where defendant 24 hours earlier had been involved 
in robbery-murders committed "in an especially violent manner" 
and defendant believed to have a semi-automatic weapon); State v. 
Ford, 310 Or. at 638-39, 801 P.2d at 763-64 (entry without notice 
lawful where officers knew or had reason to believe defendant had 
"five concealable firearms in his possession" and "had an 
extensive criminal history" which contained "substantial evidence 
of his potentially violent character"). 
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authority and purpose, Court declined to order suppression of 
evidence seized). 
However, the court's implicit holding that a thirty 
second period10 between the knock and entry was inadequate is 
incorrect, and this Court, in order to provide direction to law 
enforcement in future cases, should address the court's error. 
Under section 77-23-10(1), an officer may forcibly 
enter premises to execute a warrant if, after proper notice is 
given, "there is no response or [the officer] is not admitted 
with reasonable promptness." This Court has never decided how 
long an officer must wait for a response before entering, or what 
period of time constitutes "reasonable promptness." Other courts 
have held that once notice is given, the officer must "wait a 
reasonable period of time before he may break and enter into the 
premises to be searched," State v. Carufel, 112 R.I. 664, 668, 
314 A.2d 144, 146 (1974) (citation omitted), so that the occupant 
is "'given a reasonable opportunity to surrender his privacy 
voluntarily,'" People v. Abdon, 30 Cal.App.3d 972, 977, 106 
Cal.Rptr. 879, 881-882 (1972) (quoting United States ex rel. 
Ametrane v. Gable, 276 F. Supp. 555, 559 (E.D. Pa. 1967)) 
(emphasis omitted). But see State v. Rauch, 99 Idaho 586, 593 
n.3, 586 P.2d 671, 678 n.3 (1978) ("The 'knock and announce' 
10
 As previously noted, Agent Conner's testimony that 
approximately thirty seconds elapsed between the officers' 
initial knock on the door and their entry into defendants' 
residence was the only evidence presented on that point (see n.2, 
supra at 5) Accordingly, the court's finding of "less than 30 
seconds" is most reasonably interpreted as less than but nearly 
thirty seconds. 
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statutes do not require that police wait any appreciable time 
before entering a house after they have complied with the 
statute."). A number of decisions have upheld entries where the 
police have waited from ten to thirty seconds after giving 
notice. E.g. United States v. Streeter, 907 F.2d 781, 788-89 
(8th Cir. 1990) (10 seconds sufficient where highly flammable and 
toxic chemicals were inside and officers heard movement behind 
door); United States v. DeLutis, 722 F.2d 902, 908-09 (1st Cir. 
1983) (in general, 20 seconds sufficient); Irwin v. State, 415 
So.2d 1181, 1183 (Ala. Crim. App.) (20 seconds sufficient), cert, 
denied, 459 U.S. 971 (1982); Carter v. State, 418 A.2d 989, 993-
94 (Del. 1980) (30 seconds sufficient). 
Although it is not practicable to prescribe for all 
possible scenarios an absolute minimum waiting period which 
officers must observe before entering after giving notice11, 
Streeter, 907 F.2d at 789, United States v. Ruminer, 786 F.2d 
381, 384 (10th Cir. 1986), this Court should reject the trial 
court's apparent conclusion that thirty seconds was not adequate 
here. A thirty second waiting period is within the lower limits 
generally recognized by the courts. See DeLutis, 722 F.2d at 909 
(20 seconds generally accepted as a reasonable waiting period). 
11
 Of course, there are situations where no notice or 
waiting period would be required, or where the required waiting 
period would be significantly shortened due to developing 
circumstances. These situations generally fall into one of the 
following exceptions to the knock-and-announce rule: the 
destruction-of-evidence exception, the danger-to-person 
exception, and the "useless gesture" exception. See generally 2 
W. LaFave, Search and Seizure, § 4.8 at 280-87 (1987). 
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Accordingly, in order to provide needed direction to law 
enforcement, this Court should make clear that, in cases where 
one of the exceptions to the knock-and-announce requirement is 
not present (see n.9, supra at 17), an officer who, after giving 
proper notice and before entering, waits at least twenty seconds 
for a response or some affirmative indication of voluntary 
admittance has complied with section 77-23-10(1). Of course, 
such a rule must be tempered by the general principle that what 
is a reasonable waiting period necessarily depends on the facts 
of each case. See United States v. McConnev, 728 F.2d 1195, 1206 
(9th Cir. 1984) (en banc) ("The interval of time an officer must 
wait between announcement and entry depends on the circumstances 
of each case."); Streeter, 907 F.2d at 789; Irwin, 415 So.2d at 
1183. 
B. Fourth Amendment Violation and Exclusionary Rule 
Although the officers violated section 77-23-10(1), it 
is far from settled that this violation of the knock-and-announce 
statute either constitutes a violation of the fourth amendment or 
triggers the exclusionary rule. Defendant argues that a 
violation of the statute necessarily encompasses a fourth 
amendment violation and suppression is the only remedy. 
In State v. Buck, 756 P.2d 700 (Utah 1988), this Court 
held that a no-knock execution of a search warrant in violation 
of section 77-23-10 was not a per se violation of the fourth 
amendment because the defendant was not at home at the time of 
the entry. Affirming the trial court's denial of the defendant's 
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motion to suppress, the Court reasoned that "[a]lthough the[] 
[officers'] unannounced entry was not authorized by the warrant, 
it did not contribute appreciably to the invasion of privacy 
already authorized by the warrant". 756 P.2d at 703. However, 
the Court did not address the issue of whether a per se 
constitutional violation occurs or whether the exclusionary rule 
applies when an officer violates the knock-and-announce statute 
and the defendant is on the premises. 
The courts are split on whether a violation of the 
knock-and-announce rule in the latter circumstance is a per se 
violation of the fourth amendment. Compare, e.g., People v. 
Wolaenmuth, 69 111.2d 154, 370 N.E.2d 1067, 1072 (1977) (mere 
failure of police to announce their authority and purpose is not 
per se violation of fourth amendment), cert, denied, 436 U.S. 908 
(1978), with United States v. Baker, 638 F.2d 198, 202 & n.7 
(10th Cir. 1980) (violation of federal knock-and-announce statute 
constitutes violation of the fourth amendment). The United 
States Supreme Court has never definitively held that compliance 
with the knock-and-announce rule is required by the fourth 
amendment. See Ker v. California, 374 U.S. 23 (1963) (where a 
majority of the Court did not reach a definitive conclusion as to 
whether violation of a knock-and-announce statute encompasses a 
fourth amendment violation). But see United States v. Mueller, 
902 F.2d 336, 343 (5th Cir. 1990) (noting that "[s]ince Ker, most 
of the circuits have followed, although with certain 
embellishments, the four-Justice dissent in Ker, which contended 
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that a violation of the 'knock-and-announce' rule of [18 U.S.C.] 
section 3109 should also be a violation of the fourth 
amendment"). Furthermore, the courts are not in complete 
agreement that suppression must be the remedy for violation of 
the knock-and-announce rule. Compare, e.g., Commonwealth v. 
Morgan, 517 Pa. 93, 534 A.2d 1054, 1056 & n.2 (1987) (suggesting 
that violation of Pennsylvania's knock-and-announce rule does not 
necessarily require suppression), with Dicesare, 765 F.2d at 895 
(violation of federal knock-and-announce statute requires 
suppression). See also Buck, 756 P.2d at 703-04 (Zimmerman, J., 
concurring) (discussing need for remedy if noncompliance with 
section 77-23-10 were to become commonplace). Compare State v. 
Fixel, 744 P.2d 1366, 1369 (Utah 1987) (concluding that although 
officer acted outside of his statutory geographical authority in 
an undercover purchase of narcotics, suppression of evidence 
would be "a remedy out of all proportion to the benefits gained 
to the end of obtaining justice while preserving individual 
liberties unimpaired"); United States v. Searp, 586 F.2d 1117 
(6th Cir. 1978) (violation of nighttime search provision is 
procedural and does not necessarily require suppression), cert. 
denied, 440 U.S. 921 (1979). 
However, to resolve the suppression issue presented 
here, this Court need not decide whether the violation of section 
77-23-10 that occurred in this case is either of constitutional 
magnitude or must be remedied by applying the exclusionary rule. 
As the trial court correctly concluded, because no incriminating 
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evidence was found in the search of defendant's residence, the 
only issue is whether the violation of section 77-23-10 tainted 
defendant's subsequent consents to the search of his storage 
unit, such that the evidence seized from that place must be 
suppressed — an issue the trial court correctly resolved in 
favor of the State. Even if it were assumed the officers' 
violation of the knock-and-announce statute is the type of prior 
"illegal police action" contemplated by Arroyo and its 
voluntariness/police exploitation test for determining the 
validity of a consent to search which follows police misconduct, 
defendant's consents were valid. 
C. Arroyo Analysis 
Under Arroyo, the inquiry whether a consent to search 
is lawfully obtained following illegal police action must focus 
on two factors: (1) whether the consent was voluntary, and (2) 
whether the consent was obtained by police exploitation of the 
prior illegality. 796 P.2d at 688. The trial court concluded 
that both of defendant's written consents to the search of his 
storage unit (State's Exs. 2-S and 5-S, copies of which are 
contained in Appendix C) were voluntary and not obtained by 
police exploitation of the prior illegality (i.e., the entry in 
violation of section 77-23-10). Order at 11-13 (R. 77-79). 
Without referring to any standards of review, defendant asks this 
Court to overturn the lower court's ruling. 
Standards of Review 
Before the trial court's Arroyo analysis is examined, 
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the standards of review applicable to each prong of the Arroyo 
test must be discussed. 
"[A] consent which is not voluntarily given is 
invalid." Arroyo, 796 P.2d at 688 (citations omitted). A 
totality of circumstances test applies to ascertain whether the 
consent to search was in fact voluntarily given and not the 
result of "duress or coercion, express or implied." Schneckloth 
v. Bustamonte, 412 U.S. 218, 248-49 (1973). "'[B]oth the 
characteristics of the accused and the details of the police 
conduct" are considered. Arroyo, 796 P.2d at 689 (quoting 
Schneckloth, 412 U.S. at 226). Whether a defendant voluntarily 
consented is a question of fact on which the state carries the 
burden of proof. United States v. Mendenhall, 446 U.S. 544, 557 
(1980); State v. Webb, 790 P.2d 65, 82 (Utah App. 1990). Under 
the great weight of authority, the state must prove voluntary 
consent by a preponderance of the evidence.12 
12
 See, e^g., United States v. Matlock, 415 U.S. 164, 177 
n.14 (1974) (where, in reviewing the voluntariness of a consent 
to a warrantless search, the Court said that the "controlling 
burden of proof at suppression hearings should impose no greater 
burden than proof by a preponderance of the evidence"); Bouriailv 
v. United States, 483 U.S. 171, 176 (1987) (citing Matlock for 
the principle that "voluntariness of consent to search must be 
shown by a preponderance of the evidence"); United States v. 
Hurtado, 905 F.2d 74, 76 (5th Cir. 1990); People v. Harris, 199 
111.App.3d 1008, 557 N.E.2d 1277, 1279 (1990)/ State v. Cress, 
576 A.2d 1366, 1367 (Me. 1990); State v. O'Dell, 576 A.2d 425, 
427 (R.I. 1990); People v. Henderson, 220 Cal.App.3d 1632, 1650, 
270 Cal.Rptr. 248, 257 (1990). While acceptance of the 
preponderance standard in this context is not universal, see 4 W. 
LaFave, Search and Seizure, § 11.2(c) at 236-37 (1987), and the 
Supreme Court has made clear that "the States are free pursuant 
to their own law, to adopt a higher standard[,] [in that] [t]hey 
may indeed differ as to the appropriate resolution of the values 
they find at stake," Lego v. Twomev, 404 U.S. 477, 489 (1972), 
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The trial court's finding of voluntary consent will not 
be disturbed unless clearly erroneous. Webb, 790 P.2d at 82 ("We 
deferentially review a trial court's finding of voluntary 
consent, like other factual determinations underlying the denial 
of the motion to suppress, disturbing it only if the appellant 
demonstrates clear error."). See also Ashe, 745 P.2d at 1258. A 
finding is clearly erroneous if "it is 'against the clear weight 
that standard is consistent with this Court's adoption of a 
preponderance standard in the confession context. State v. 
Carter, 776 P.2d 886, 890 (Utah 1989) ("State bears burden of 
proving by at least a preponderance of the evidence that a 
defendant's confession is voluntary"). 
The trial court applied a clear and convincing standard 
of proof, finding the State had met this standard in proving 
voluntary consent. Order at 11-13 (R. 77-79). That standard is 
the one the Utah Court of Appeals appears to have adopted. See 
State v. Marshall, 791 P.2d 880, 887-88 (Utah App.) (following 
United States v. Abbott, 546 F.2d 883, 885 (10th Cir. 1976)), 
cert, denied, 800 P.2d 1105 (Utah 1990); State v. Webb, 790 P.2d 
at 82; but see State v. Carter, 812 P.2d 460, 467 n.7 (Utah App. 
1991) (declining to specify what standard of proof applies), 
cert, denied, No. 910340 (Utah Feb. 18, 1992). However, this 
Court should make clear that a preponderance standard is 
appropriate, based on the reasoning of Lego v. Twomev, 404 U.S. 
at 486-89, where the Court drew clear and valid distinctions 
between the question of admissibility and the question of guilt: 
"Since the purpose that a voluntariness hearing is designed to 
serve has nothing whatever to do with improving the reliability 
of jury verdicts, we cannot accept the charge that judging the 
admissibility of a confession by a preponderance of the evidence 
undermines the mandate of In re Winship, 397 U.S. 358 [] 
(1970)[,] [which confirmed the fundamental right of an accused 
against conviction except upon proof beyond a reasonable doubt]." 
See also United States v. Miller, 589 F.2d 1117, 1130-31 (1st 
Cir. 1978) (criticizing United States v. Abbott as applying an 
unduly strict standard of proof), cert, denied, 440 U.S. 958 
(1979). But see State v. Ramirez, 817 P.2d 774, (Utah 1991) 
("trial court should regard with caution any claim that the 
suspect 'consented'" to a search). 
However, should this Court adopt a clear and convincing 
standard, the trial court's finding that the State met the higher 
standard is supported by the record. 
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of the evidence, or if the appellate court otherwise reaches a 
firm conviction that a mistake has been made.'" State v. 
Goodman, 763 P.2d 786 (Utah 1989) (quoting State v. Walker, 743 
P.2d 191, 193 (Utah 1987)).13 And, "[i]n order to show clear 
error, the appellant must marshal all the evidence in support of 
the trial court's findings of fact and then demonstrate that the 
evidence, including all reasonable inferences drawn therefrom, is 
insufficient to support the findings against an attack." State 
v, Moosman, 794 P.2d 474, 475-76 (Utah 1990) (footnote citation 
omitted). 
13
 The Utah Court of Appeals has been unable to agree on the 
standard of review for voluntary consent determinations. Compare 
Webb, 790 P.2d at 82 (consent determination a question of fact 
reviewed under a clearly erroneous standard), with State v. Bobo, 
803 P.2d 1268, 1272 (Utah App. 1990) (trial court's ultimate 
determination of voluntary consent is a conclusion of law which 
is reviewed de novo on appeal). See also State v. Grovier, 808 
P.2d 133, 137 n.l (Utah App. 1991) (declining to follow Bobo and 
applying "Utah and federal case law which views the question of 
whether consent to search is 'voluntary' as a question of fact"); 
State v. Carter, 812 P.2d 460, 468-69 n.8 (Utah App. 1991) 
(discussing the split in panels and stating that the issue 
"should be definitively determined by the Utah Supreme Court"), 
cert, denied. No. 910340 (Utah Feb. 18, 1992). 
This issue is easily resolved when, as in the instant 
case, a challenge to a consent search is made under the fourth 
amendment. The United States Supreme Court, in ruling that the 
consent determination is a finding of fact rather than a 
conclusion of law, Schneckloth, 412 U.S. at 222, 227, has in 
effect construed the fourth amendment as not embracing the 
consent question. Thus, insofar as Bobo stands for the 
proposition that consent is a legal question under the fourth 
amendment, the law which presumably applies, it is contrary to 
the construction of the fourth amendment adopted by the final 
arbiter of that provision. In short, given Schneckloth, a state 
appellate court is not free to characterize the consent 
determination as anything but a finding of fact, when the 
challenge to the consent search is made under federal 
constitutional law. 
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Whether there has been police exploitation of the prior 
illegality or, put another way, whether there was sufficient 
attenuation between the illegality and the consent to search, see 
Arroyo, 796 P.2d at 690-91 & n.4, is also a question of fact. 
United States v. Butts, 729 F.2d 1514, 1527 (5th Cir. 1984) 
(Jolly, J., dissenting) ("Whether the connection between the 
illegal conduct and the questioned evidence [defendant's 
statements] is attenuated is largely a fact question to be 
determined and evaluated in each case."), cert, denied, 469 U.S. 
855 (1984); People v. Convers, 510 N.Y.S.2d 552, 554, 503 N.E.2d 
108, 109-10 (N.Y. 1986) (attenuation determination reviewed under 
standard that looks only to see whether there is support in the 
record); People v. Williams, 8 Cal.App.3d 44, 86 Cal.Rptr. 821, 
824 (1970) ("Whether or not . . . attenuation exists is a 
question of fact for the trial court to resolve."). Therefore, 
the same standards of review that apply to the voluntariness 
determination apply to the trial court's exploitation/attenuation 
determination. 
With these standards of review in mind, the trial 
court's application of the Arroyo test can now be examined. 
Consent 
The court's finding that defendant voluntarily 
consented to the search of his storage unit is supported by the 
record. In arguing that his consent was involuntary, defendant 
fails to demonstrate that the court's contrary finding is clearly 
erroneous (i.e., against the clear weight of the evidence). 
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Furthermore, he ignores many of the specific, component factual 
findings which were part of the court's finding of voluntary 
consent. 
As to the first consent given by defendant for the 
search of the storage unit, the court found: 
There can be little doubt from the 
perspective of the defendant, chaos reigned 
for about an hour following the forced entry 
by six officers with guns drawn. Within 45 
minutes, however, things began to calm. By 
7:00 or 7:15 a.m., almost an hour had passed 
since the forced entry and defendant had been 
treated by the paramedics, was clothed and 
had called his employer. What is most 
persuasive, however, is the testimony of both 
defendant and Agent Swehla. Just ten minutes 
before defendant first consented to a search 
of the storage unit, Agent Swehla read an 
identical consent forirrA verbatim to 
defendant. The consent form is itself clear 
and unequivocal and the court has found from 
the totality of the circumstances that 
defendant understood the consent.15 
Defendant himself testified that he was not 
coerced. . . . 
Order at 11-12 (R. 77-78). The court also specifically found 
14
 The court's reference to an "identical consent form" is 
to the forms defendant signed for the search of two automobiles 
and a camper. See Order at 5 (R. 71) (State's Exs. 3-S and 4-S). 
15
 This consent form, like all the others, acknowledged that 
(1) defendant had been informed of his constitutional right not 
to have a search of the described premises conducted without a 
warrant and of his right to refuse to consent to such a search; 
(2) he understood he was not under arrest; (3) he understood he 
could revoke the consent at any time before the search was 
completed; (4) he understood that any incriminating evidence 
found during the search could be used against him in court or 
other proceedings; (5) he had been informed that the officers 
were looking for "hazardous explosive materials and devices;" (6) 
he gave the permission to search voluntarily; and (7) he had "not 
been threatened either by word or action and no promises of any 
sort ha[d] been made to [him]" (State's Ex. 5-S) (Appendix C). 
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that, although an officer made the suggestion that defendant's 
failure to cooperate and sign the consent form would not 
ultimately prohibit a search, this suggestion was not made to 
defendant by Agent Swehla, who acquired the first consent from 
him. Ld. at 5 (R. 71). It also found that prior to giving his 
consent, defendant had been "informed of his constitutional right 
to counsel and to remain silent." Ibid. Finally, the court made 
clear that, in finding the State had met its burden of proving 
the first consent was voluntary, the court had considered the 
specific factors outlined in State v. Whittenback, 621 P.2d 103 
(Utah 1980)16, "the activities of the hour preceding the consent 
and such factors as a continuously shackled defendant," and the 
"statement of an officer not directly involved in acquiring the 
consent suggesting a search was inevitable" — a statement which 
"did not vitiate the voluntariness of the consent" and which, 
"given the court's review of Magistrate Boyce's search warrant, . 
. • was true." Id. at 12 (R. 78). 
Defendant does not claim that either the finding of 
16
 Recognizing that to show voluntariness the prosecution is 
not required to prove the defendant knew of his right to refuse 
to consent, Whittenback sets out the following factors which may 
demonstrate a lack of duress or coercion: 
1) the absence of a claim of authority to 
search by the officers; 2) the absence of an 
exhibition of force by the officers; 3) a 
mere request to search; 4) cooperation by the 
owner of the [place to be searched]; and 5) 
the absence of deception or trick on the part 
of the officer. 
621 P.2d at 106 (footnote citation omitted). 
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voluntary consent or any of its component findings of fact are 
clearly erroneous. Rather, he simply Margue[s] selected evidence 
favorable to [his] position," and asks this Court to retry the 
facts — an approach the Court has rejected as inappropriate. 
Crookston v. Fire Insurance Exchange, 817 P.2d 789, 800 (Utah 
1991). Moreover, he fails to show that the trial court drew any 
unreasonable inferences from the facts it found. In short, 
defendant has not carried his burden on appeal to show that the 
court's finding as to defendant's first consent is clearly 
erroneous. Indeed, the court's finding of voluntary consent has 
substantial support in the record. 
Defendant's argument is equally deficient with respect 
to his second consent to the search of the storage unit. 
Regarding that consent, the court made the following pertinent 
findings: although defendant had been handcuffed throughout much 
of the period following the officers' initial entry, defendant 
was not handcuffed for "20 minutes to one hour at the storage 
unit and in transit;" at the storage unit "Agent Conner went over 
the consent form with defendant point by point before he signed 
it;" "[d]efendant understood the consent and testified himself 
that his signature was not coerced;" and defendant "also 
understood that the form was similar to that which he previously 
signed for Agent Swehla." Order at 6 (R. 72). The court 
concluded: 
The same factors and evidence [that 
applied to the first consent] apply to the 
second consent to search the storage unit 
which was granted at 11:29 a.m. At the time 
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of the second consent, however, the chaos of 
the initial entry was over six hours distant, 
defendant had been informed of his Miranda 
rights a second time and Agent Conner 
reviewed anew each item on the consent form. 
The court therefore concludes from a totality 
of the circumstances that the State has met 
its burden of proof that the second consent 
to search the storage unit was knowingly and 
voluntarily granted. The court makes this 
conclusion after fully considering that 
defendant was shackled for six hours at the 
time he signed the second consent form for 
the storage unit.17 
Id. at 12-13 (R. 78-79). Again, defendant does not show that 
the court's finding of voluntary consent is clearly erroneous, 
content simply to suggest that this Court make a different 
finding on the voluntariness question. Moreover, the record 
provides substantial support for the court's finding. 
In sum, in the absence of a showing that the trial 
court was clearly erroneous, there is no basis for disturbing its 
findings that both of defendant's consents were voluntary. 
Therefore, the court's determination on the first prong of the 
Arroyo test should be upheld. 
Exploitation 
The exploitation prong of the Arroyo test is not so 
easily understood or applied. Addressing this prong, the trial 
court said: 
17
 In arguing both the voluntariness and exploitation prongs 
of Arroyo, defendant places undue emphasis on his being 
handcuffed much of the time and being continuously detained. See 
Br. of Appellant at 11-14. It is well settled that handcuffs and 
custody, while factors to be considered, do not themselves render 
consent involuntary. State v. Bobo, 803 P.2d 1268, 1273-74 (Utah 
App. 1990); State v. Webb, 790 P.2d 65, 82 (Utah App. 1990). 
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The same evidence which persuaded this court 
that each consent was knowingly and 
voluntarily granted equally but independently 
persuades this court that the officers did 
not exploit the initial unlawful entry. The 
circumstances and passage of time from the 
entry to the first consent purged each of the 
consents from the taint of the unauthorized 
"no-knock" entry. The officers did nothing 
to harken back to the entry and did not make 
any further unnecessary show of force not 
otherwise implicit by their presence. 
Focusing solely on the second consent to 
search the storage unit, the passage of time 
proved to be the best antiseptic, cleansing 
the second consent of any taint from the 
unlawful "no-knock" entry. 
Order at 13 (R. 79). Before reviewing this finding of no 
exploitation, some discussion of the second prong of the Arroyo 
test, and the need for this Court to clarify the operation of 
that prong, is necessary. 
Without explaining precisely how the exploitation 
analysis is to proceed, Arroyo suggested only that the specific 
inquiry is whether the consent was sufficiently "attenuated" from 
the prior illegality such that the consent was not "tainted" by 
that illegality. 796 P.2d at 690-91. The Court noted the Brown 
v. Illinois, 422 U.S. 590 (1975), factors which should be 
considered, .id., at 690-91 n.4, but did not make clear whether the 
primary focus of the exploitation analysis is the possible effect 
of the initial police misconduct on the voluntariness of the 
consent or rather the police misconduct itself. Arroyo cites 
numerous cases on the issue of exploitation, ,id. at 690-91, but 
does not express a preference for one of the two approaches those 
cases appear to adopt. Under one approach, voluntariness of the 
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consent is the primary consideration, and if there is voluntary 
consent (i.e., the consent has not been rendered involuntary by 
the prior police illegality), the evidence seized pursuant to the 
consent is generally admissible. Under the other approach, the 
police misconduct itself is the primary consideration. A consent 
to search that is obtained close in time and circumstance to the 
police illegality, although entirely voluntary, is "tainted," and 
the evidence seized pursuant to the consent is inadmissible. 
For example, some of the cases cited in Arroyo discuss 
the exploitation question primarily in terms of the potential 
effect of the police misconduct on the voluntariness of the 
consent. See, e.g., United States v. Miller, 821 F.2d 546, 550 
(11th Cir. 1987) ("[W]e hold that the consent was the product of 
the illegal detention, and that the taint of the unreasonable 
stop was not sufficiently attenuated. . . . [T]here were 
insufficient intervening circumstances that might have reduced 
the coercive nature of the stop and permitted the appellant to 
make a voluntary decision about the consent search."); United 
States v. Taheri, 648 F.2d 598, 601 (9th Cir. 1981) ("no 
intervening events or lapse of time which would show [the 
defendant's] consent was 'sufficiently an act of free will to 
purge the primary taint of the unlawful invasion'"); State v. 
Raheem, 464 So.2d 293, 298 (La. 1985) ("Under the circumstances 
presented here, we cannot say that [the defendant's] consent was 
sufficiently attenuated from the illegal arrest and search to be 
a product of her free will."). 
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On the other hand, some of the cases mechanically apply 
the exploitation analysis with no apparent concern about whether 
the voluntariness of the consent has been undermined by the 
police misconduct. These cases seem to focus solely on the 
police misconduct and whether it "taints" the consent such that 
the evidence seized must be suppressed under the "fruit of the 
poisonous tree" doctrine. See, e.g., United States v. Melendez-
Gonzalez, 727 F.2d 407, 414-15 (5th Cir. 1984); United States v. 
Thompson, 712 F.2d 1356, 1362 (11th Cir. 1983); People v. Odom, 
83 Ill.App.3d 1022, 39 111.Dec. 406, 404 N.E.2d 997, 1002 (1980). 
The latter approach was followed by two panels of the 
Utah Court of Appeals in State v. Sims, 808 P.2d 141 (Utah App. 
1991), cert, pending, 167 Utah Adv. Rep. 25 (Utah May 14, 1991), 
and State v. Park, 810 P.2d 456 (Utah App.), cert, denied, 827 
P.2d 327 (Utah 1991), which involved consent searches after 
illegal roadblock stops18. In Sims, the panel began its 
analysis by acknowledging that the defendant did not challenge 
the voluntariness of his consent to the search, but that he 
claimed "there was insufficient attenuation between his detention 
and the consent . . . to purge the taint of the illegality of the 
detention." 808 P.2d at 150. It applied the Brown v. Illinois 
18
 At the time the roadblocks were set up in Sims and Park, 
there was no decision from either Utah's appellate courts or the 
United States Supreme Court that had directly ruled on the 
legality of such roadblocks. See generally Sims, 808 P.2d at 
142-50. Thus, the roadblocks could not be fairly characterized 
as flagrant violations of the fourth amendment or article I, 
section 14 of the Utah Constitution, even though the court of 
appeals concluded that they violated those provisions. 
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factors which Arroyo identified as pertinent to the evaluation of 
the "non-exploitation or attenuation element": "the temporal 
proximity of the primary illegality and the granting of the 
consent, the presence or absence of intervening circumstances, 
and the purpose and flagrancy of the illegal police conduct." 
Ibid. Concluding that "the record demonstrates [the defendant's] 
consent to search his vehicle was arrived at by exploitation of 
the illegal roadblock," id,, at 152, the panel relied most heavily 
on two factors: (1) "the consent was obtained within minutes of 
the illegal stop, and not even under our clear error standard of 
review could the trial court find enough time between the stop 
and the grant of consent to attenuate the relationship between 
the two;" and (2) "the record reveal[ed] [no] possibility of 
intervening circumstances between the illegal stop and [the 
defendant's] grant of consent to the search," id. at 151. An 
identical approach was followed by the Park panel in reversing 
the trial court's denial of the defendant's motion to suppress. 
810 P.2d at 458-59. 
This mechanical application of the exploitation prong, 
which automatically invalidates a search and/or seizure if the 
voluntary consent is closely connected in time and by 
circumstance to the prior illegality (a scenario which is 
frequently present in these kinds of cases), amounts to the "but 
for" rule of exclusion that was rejected in Wong Sun v. United 
States, 371 U.S. 471, 487-88 (1963). See United States v. 
Wellins, 654 F.2d 550, 555 (9th Cir. 1981) ("lack of significant 
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intervening period of time does not, in itself, require that the 
evidence be suppressed for want of sufficient attenuation"). As 
stated in Arroyo, "'all evidence is [not] 'fruit of the poisonous 
tree' simply because it would not have come to light but for the 
illegal actions of the police.'" 796 P.2d at 688 (quoting Wong 
Sun, 371 U.S. at 487-88) (citation omitted). But, given Arroyo's 
ambiguous discussion of the exploitation prong, it was not 
unreasonable for the court of appeals to interpret Arroyo as 
setting forth the mechanical rule applied in Sims and Park. What 
those cases illustrate is the need for clarification by this 
Court of how the exploitation prong should be applied by the 
lower courts. 
A fundamental problem with Sims and Park is that they 
fail to acknowledge that in Arroyo the Court remanded to the 
trial court for a determination of the exploitation issue under 
nearly identical facts (i.e., an illegal vehicle stop which was 
followed shortly thereafter by the defendant's consent to a 
search of the vehicle). 796 P.2d at 692. Had this Court 
considered the close temporal proximity between the illegal stop 
and the consent, coupled with the absence of any intervening 
circumstances, to be dispositive of the exploitation question, as 
Sims and Park concluded, it presumably would not have remanded 
for a determination of that question by the trial court. In 
ordering a remand, Arroyo implicitly rejected the mechanical 
approach to the exploitation analysis employed in Sims and Park. 
The contrary approach to the exploitation inquiry, 
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which focuses primarily on the possible effect of the police 
misconduct on the voluntariness of the consent, appears to be 
most consistent with Florida v. Rover, 460 U.S. 491 (1983), 
identified in Arroyo as an example of the application of the 
exploitation prong in a consent search case. 796 P.2d at 690. 
In Rover, the police stopped the defendant at an airport based on 
a drug courier profile and ultimately obtained his consent to a 
search of his luggage, in which narcotics were found.19 Royer 
moved to suppress the contraband seized from his luggage. The 
trial court denied the motion, ruling that Royer's consent to the 
search was "freely and voluntarily" given. 460 U.S. at 495. The 
intermediate appellate court of Florida reversed, holding that 
Royer's detention was unlawful and that the unlawful detention 
tainted Royer's consent to search. Ibid. That decision was 
19
 The Court recounted Royer's consent as follows: 
[After the detectives had removed Royer to a 
small room and retrieved his luggage from the 
airline], Royer was asked if he would consent 
to a search of the suitcases. Without orally 
responding to this request, Royer produced a 
key and unlocked one of the suitcases, which 
one detective then opened without seeking 
further assent from Royer. Marihuana was 
found in that suitcase. According to 
Detective Johnson, Royer stated that he did 
not know the combination to the lock on the 
second suitcase. When asked if he objected 
to the detective opening the second suitcase, 
Royer said "[n]o, go ahead," and did not 
object when the detective explained that the 
suitcase might have to be broken open. The 
suitcase was pried open by the officers and 
more marihuana was found. . . . 
460 U.S. at 494-95. 
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affirmed by the Supreme Court in a plurality opinion. 460 U.S. 
at 493-508. Although, as noted in Arroyo, 796 P.2d at 690, the 
plurality never directly questioned the trial court's finding 
that Royer's consent was "freely and voluntarily" given, it 
nevertheless appears to have been primarily concerned with the 
coercive circumstances under which the consent was obtained and 
the effect those circumstances had on the voluntariness of the 
consent. This is evident from Justice Powell's concurrence, in 
which he wrote: "I agree with the plurality that . . . [the 
defendant's] surrender of the luggage key to the officers cannot 
be viewed as consensual." 460 U.S. at 509 (Powell, J., 
concurring). 
In Arroyo, this Court rejected an exploitation analysis 
that focuses solely on voluntariness, declining to adopt the 
reasoning of United States v. Carson, 793 F.2d 1141 (10th Cir.), 
cert, denied, 479 U.S. 914 (1986). There, the Tenth Circuit 
Court of Appeals held: 
[I]n a case in which evidence is obtained 
pursuant to consent granted subsequent to 
illegal police actions, the "exploitation" 
issue under Wong Sun is resolved simply by 
determining whether or not defendant's grant 
of consent was voluntary under the 
circumstances. . . . When defendant's grant 
of consent is voluntary, then there is no 
exploitation; . . . the findings of voluntary 
consent and "exploitation" are mutually 
exclusive. 
793 F.2d at 1149 (emphasis in original). However, the Court's 
rejection of Carson must be considered in connection with its 
reliance on Rover. In this light, Arroyo is most reasonably read 
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as adopting an exploitation analysis that focuses primarily, but 
not solely, on the voluntariness of the consent to search. Under 
such an approach, the Brown v. Illinois factors are more easily 
and logically applied. 
In Brown, the Supreme Court had before it the narrow 
question of whether "the Illinois courts were in error in 
assuming that the Miranda warnings, by themselves, under Wong Sun 
always purge the taint of an illegal arrest." 422 U.S. at 605. 
Brown had been arrested without probable cause and without a 
warrant; and, while in custody and after being given Miranda 
warnings, he made two inculpatory statements concerning a murder. 
Id. at 591, 594-95. The Illinois Supreme Court ruled that, 
although Brown's arrest was illegal, the giving of Miranda 
warnings "'served to break the causal connection between the 
illegal arrest and the giving of the statements, and that 
defendant's act in making the statements was 'sufficiently an act 
of free will to purge the primary taint of the unlawful 
invasion.' (Wong Sun v. United States, 371 U.S. 471, at 486.)'" 
Id. at 597 (quoting People v. Brown, 56 111.2d 312, 317, 307 
N.E.2d 356, 358 (1974)). At bottom, the state court held that 
"the Miranda warnings in and of themselves broke the causal chain 
so that any subsequent statement, even one induced by the 
continuing effects of unconstitutional custody, was admissible so 
long as, in the traditional sense, it was voluntary and not 
coerced in violation of the Fifth and Fourteenth Amendments." 
Ibid. The Supreme Court granted certiorari to address the 
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implication of its holding in Wong Sun to the facts of Brown's 
case. Ibid. 
The Court began by reviewing its holding in Wong Sun, 
where the issue was "whether statements and other evidence 
obtained after an illegal arrest or search should be excluded." 
Id. at 597. The statements were obtained from two defendants, 
Wong Sun and Toy. Toy's statement was obtained immediately after 
he was pursued and illegally arrested by six agents. It 
apparently was a spontaneous response to a question asked him in 
the frenzy of that event, and the agents apparently made no 
attempt to advise him of his right to remain silent. On the 
other hand, Wong Sun's statement, also obtained after an illegal 
arrest, was not given until after he was arraigned and released 
on his own recognizance. He voluntarily returned to the station 
a few days after his arrest for questioning, and his statement 
came after he had been advised of his right to remain silent and 
to have counsel present. Td. at 607-08 (Powell, J., concurring 
in part). Under these facts, the Wong Sun Court ruled that Toy's 
statement should not have been admitted as evidence against him, 
holding that "the statement did not result from 'an intervening 
independent act of a free will,' and that it was not 
'sufficiently an act of free will to purge the primary taint of 
the unlawful invasion.'" .Id. at 598 (quoting Wong Sun, 371 U.S. 
at 486). However, with respect to Wong Sun's confession, the 
Court ruled that it was admissible because "the connection 
between his unlawful arrest and the statement 'had become so 
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attenuated as to dissipate the taint.'" Ibid, (quoting Wong Sun, 
371 U.S. at 491) (citation omitted). 
The Brown Court then made clear that "[t]he 
exclusionary rule . . . was applied in Wong Sun primarily to 
protect Fourth Amendment rights. Protection of the Fifth 
Amendment right against self-incrimination was not the Court's 
paramount concern there." Id. at 599 (emphasis in original). In 
short, the Court's foremost concern was to apply the fourth 
amendment exclusionary rule where it would serve its primary 
purpose of deterring illegal conduct by the police — thus the 
different rulings regarding Toy's statement and Wong Sun's 
statement. As Justice Powell admonished in his concurring 
opinion, "the Wong Sun inquiry always should be conducted with 
the deterrent purpose of the Fourth Amendment exclusionary rule 
sharply in focus." Id. at 612 (Powell, J., concurring in part) 
(citation omitted). 
It was against this backdrop that the Brown Court 
rejected the per se rule of admission adopted by the Illinois 
courts and also declined to adopt an alternative per se or "but 
for" rule of exclusion. Instead, the Court concluded that "[t]he 
question whether a confession is the product of a free will under 
Wong Sun must be answered on the facts of each case[,] [and] no 
single fact is dispositive." .Id. at 603. It made clear that the 
presence of Miranda warnings does not control the determination 
of whether a confession that has followed a fourth amendment 
violation is admissible. While that factor is important in 
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determining whether the confession is obtained by exploitation of 
the fourth amendment violation, other relevant factors are to be 
considered, including: "[t]he temporal proximity of the arrest 
and the confession, the presence of intervening circumstances, 
and, particularly, the purpose and flagrancy of the official 
misconduct." Id. at 603-04 (footnotes and citations omitted). 
It is with this understanding of Wong Sun and Brown 
that Arroyo must be read. As previously discussed, Arroyo 
specifically relied on Rover as an example of the application of 
the exploitation analysis to a case where evidence was seized 
pursuant to a consent to search which followed an initial fourth 
amendment violation. The Rover plurality's primary concern 
appears to have been the voluntariness of the consent to search. 
Thus, Arroyo's reference to the Brown factors, coupled with its 
reliance on Rover and its rejection of Carson, is most reasonably 
interpreted as an adoption of an exploitation analysis which (1) 
focuses primarily, but not solely, on the voluntariness of the 
consent, (2) applies the Brown factors to determine whether the 
voluntariness of the consent was in fact affected by the prior 
police illegality, and (3) considers whether the police 
misconduct was sufficiently flagrant or purposeful that the 
evidence should be excluded even though the consent to search was 
entirely voluntary. The inquiry would proceed as follows: (1) 
Was the the consent in fact rendered involuntary by the temporal 
proximity between the fourth amendment violation and the consent, 
the absence of any intervening circumstances, or flagrant police 
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misconduct?20 (2) Even if it is determined that the consent was 
voluntary after consideration of the possible effect of all three 
Brown factors, was the police misconduct purposeful or flagrant 
such that the evidence should be excluded in order to deter that 
level of police misconduct? With respect to this second 
question, if there is a purposeful or flagrant violation of the 
fourth amendment, then the first two Brown factors (temporal 
proximity and intervening circumstances) are considered to 
determine if there is sufficient "attenuation" to remove the 
"taint" from the flagrant violation which would naturally flow 
under the "fruit of the poisonous tree" doctrine. 
In his concurring opinion in Brown, Justice Powell 
illustrated this process in the confession context: 
I would require the clearest indication of 
attenuation in cases in which official 
conduct was flagrantly abusive of Fourth 
Amendment rights.... In such cases the 
deterrent value of the exclusionary rule is 
most likely to be effective, and the 
corresponding mandate to preserve judicial 
integrity most clearly demands that the 
fruits of the official misconduct be denied. 
I thus would require some demonstrably 
effective break in the chain of events 
leading from the illegal arrest to the 
statement, such as actual consultation with 
counsel or the accused's presentation before 
a magistrate for a determination of probable 
cause, before the taint can be deemed 
removed. 
20
 Consideration of voluntariness under the exploitation 
prong of the Arroyo test may overlap to some degree with the 
voluntariness inquiry which has already occurred under the first 
prong of that test. However, under the exploitation prong, 
particular attention is paid to the police illegality and its 
possible effect on voluntariness. 
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422 U.S. at 610-11 (citations omitted). A similar analysis would 
be made in the consent to search case, and the first two Brown 
factors would determine whether the consent was sufficiently-
attenuated in terms of time and circumstance to be free of the 
taint of the flagrant police misconduct.21 
This approach recognizes both that "in some 
circumstances strict adherence to the Fourth Amendment 
exclusionary rule imposes greater cost on legitimate demands of 
law enforcement than can be justified by the rule's deterrent 
purposes," and that in cases of flagrant police misconduct "the 
deterrent value of the exclusionary rule is most likely to be 
effective." Brown, 422 U.S. at 608-09, 611 (Powell, J., 
concurring in part). 
The Court should clarify Arroyo in the foregoing 
manner. The exploitation prong will then be understandable and 
more easily applied. 
Under the proposed clarification, the trial court's 
exploitation/attenuation finding should be upheld. In fact, the 
court essentially applied Arroyo in the manner suggested. 
Apparently proceeding with the assumption that the violation of 
section 77-23-10 was not flagrant (a correct assumption, in that 
there was no indication the officers purposefully violated the 
21
 For example, had the officers' conduct in Sims actually 
been flagrant, which it was not, the court of appeals would have 
been correct in excluding the evidence on the basis that there 
was no significant lapse of time or intervening circumstances 
between the consent to search and the illegality. But in the 
absence of flagrant conduct, the approach followed in Sims was 
incorrect for the reasons previously discussed. 
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statute), the court focused primarily on the voluntariness of 
defendant's consent in light of the prior illegality. This is 
obvious from the court's statement that "[t]he same evidence 
which persuaded th[e] court that each consent was knowingly and 
voluntarily granted equally but independently persuades th[e] 
court that the officers did not exploit the initial unlawful 
entry." Order at 13 (R. 79). The court applied the first two 
Brown factors, temporal proximity and intervening circumstances, 
by specifically considering the changed circumstances and the 
passage of time between the unlawful entry and the two consents. 
Eighty-five minutes passed between the officers' initial entry 
and defendant's signing of the first consent form for the search 
of his storage unit, and the situation within his apartment had 
calmed significantly from the "chaos" associated with the entry. 
Defendant's signing of the second consent form at the storage 
unit, over five hours after the initial entry and under 
circumstances where he was not handcuffed and was allowed to move 
around (R. 128-29), was even more attenuated from the entry. See 
Order at 13. 
In sum, the trial court found that the passage of time 
and the changed circumstances significantly reduced the 
possibility that the officers' unlawful entry undermined 
defendant's free will in giving his consent. This approach is 
entirely consistent with several cases cited with apparent 
approval in Arroyo, 796 P.2d at 691, and which were noted above: 
United States v. Miller, 821 F.2d at 550 ("[W]e hold that the 
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consent was the product of the illegal detention, and that the 
taint of the unreasonable stop was not sufficiently attenuated. . 
. . [T]here were insufficient intervening circumstances that 
might have reduced the coercive nature of the stop and permitted 
the appellant to make a voluntary decision about the consent 
search."); United States v. Taheri, 648 F.2d at 601 ("no 
intervening events or lapse of time which would show [the 
defendant's] consent was 'sufficiently an act of free will to 
purge the primary taint of the unlawful invasion'"); State v. 
Raheem, 464 So.2d at 298 ("Under the circumstances presented 
here, we cannot say that [the defendant's] consent was 
sufficiently attenuated from the illegal arrest and search to be 
a product of her free will."). In that the court's finding of 
attenuation is supported by the record and defendant has not 
shown clear error, that finding should be upheld. 
CONCLUSION 
Based on the foregoing arguments, this Court should 
affirm the trial court's denial of defendant's motion to 
suppress. 
RESPECTFULLY submitted this ^_^rfay of February, 1992. 
R. PAUL VAN DAM 
Attorney General 
DAVID B. THOMPSON 
Assistant Attorney General 
RIJCHARDfG. MACDOUGALL 
Deputy County Attorney 
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APPENDIX A 
Fill ,t!ST COURT 
Thira Judicial District 
OCT 9 1991 
^SA^VLAKECDUNiy 
Dep jty CI: 
IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT 
IN AND FOR SALT LAKE COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH 
THE STATE OF UTAH, 
Plaintiff, 
vs. 
STEVEN DOUGLAS THURMAN, 
Defendant, 
MEMORANDUM DECISION AND 
ORDER 
CIVIL NO. 911900907 
Defendant Steven Douglas Thurman has moved to suppress 
evidence resulting from searches conducted under a warrant and 
written consents. Additionally, he seeks to suppress 
statements he made during the searches. Many of the pertinent 
facts are uncontested but some are necessarily part of the fact 
finding duties of the court. This Memorandum Decision 
constitutes the necessary findings of fact and conclusions of 
law. 
I. FACTS 
The defendant is charged with a capital homicide and two 
related felonies. The Information alleges that defendant 
caused the death of Adam Cook by means of a bomb which was 
JC€ 27 
STATE V. THURMAN PAGE TWO MEMORANDUM DECISION 
detonated on the night of May 15, 1991. On the night following 
the bombing incident, U.S. Magistrate Ronald Boyce issued a 
warrant to search defendant's apartment. The application for 
the search warrant requested authorization to enter defendant's 
apartment without giving notice ("no-knock" entry) and at any 
time of the day or night. The warrant issued, however, 
restricted the search to the hours between 6:00 a.m. and 10:00 
p.m. and did not authorize a "no-knock" entry. 
The basis for the warrant was the affidavit of Roderic J. 
Conner, a Special Agent with the Bureau of Alcohol, Tobacco & 
Firearms ("ATF"). All the information contained in the 
affidavit appears to have been developed in the days and hours 
following the May 15 bombing. 
Assuming the accuracy of the Conner affidavit and the 
hearsay statements therein, the following facts supporting the 
issuance of a warrant were submitted to Magistrate Boyce: A 
bomb was placed in an automobile belonging to Howard Cook and 
was detonated on May 15, 1991, injuring Mr. Cook's son, Adam. 
Mr. Cook had been having an affair with defendant's former 
wife, Wendy Thurman. The affair spanned the period before and 
after the Thurman divorce but was not the cause of the 
divorce. As recent as May 13, Cook had spent the night at 
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Wendy Thurman's residence. The defendant was aware of the 
affair between Mr. Cook and his former wife. The defendant 
reported this affair to Mr. Cook's then wife and asked her if 
she intended to allow Mr. Cook to continue to reside in the 
Cook house. While defendant had made no threats directly to 
his former wife, on at least one occasion several months before 
the bombing incident he sat in his car in the early morning 
hours outside his former wife's apartment and observed his 
former wife and Mr. Cook returning from a date. Defendant had 
expressed his anger toward and hatred for his former wife and 
indicated he had hired a private investigator to watch her and 
Mr. Cook. On the morning of May 14, a male caller to Metz 
Bakery, an establishment where both Mr. Cook and defendant's 
former wife were employed, stated that there was a bomb in one 
of the trucks. The Salt Lake County Sheriff's Office 
investigated but found no bomb. On the day of the bombing, May 
15, Mr. Cook's automobile was parked in the Metz Bakery parking 
lot from 6:00 a.m. to 4:00 p.m. At the time of the bombing, 
Mr. Cook's automobile was parked in front of the Richard Craig 
residence located at 5740 South 665 West in Murray. A neighbor 
of the Craig's observed a small two-door vehicle leave the area 
at a high rate of speed and with its lights out. The Affidavit 
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does not, however, specify the date or time when the neighbor 
made this observation. The defendant drives a Chevrolet 
Monza. (Affidavit of Roderic J. Conner, paras. 2-4, 6-10, 12). 
At 6:14 a.m. on May 17, 1991, the day following the 
issuance of the warrant and two days following the bombing, 
seven law enforcement officers executed the warrant. Six of 
the officers forced their way into defendant's apartment with 
weapons drawn less than 30 seconds after knocking. The ATF 
agent in charge of entry testified that the officers announced 
their identity and intent simultaneously with their entry. 
Defendant was in bed, asleep, naked and offering no resistance 
when he was subdued and handcuffed by the officers. In the 
process, defendant was cut on the nose and attended to by 
paramedics on the scene. The evidence does not indicate 
whether the paramedics were summoned out of concern for the 
officers' liability or the defendant's well-being. The 
paramedics treated defendant and he was allowed to dress at 
some time before 7:30 a.m. and perhaps as early as 6:30. 
Defendant was initially informed of his rights in accordance 
with the decision in Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436 (1966) 
soon after the officers' entry but before he was treated by the 
paramedics and allowed to dress. 
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At 7:30 a.m. defendant signed two forms granting consent to 
search two automobiles and a camper. ATF Agent Robert Swehla 
read the consent form verbatim to defendant. As the search at 
defendant's apartment proceeded, the officers became aware of a 
storage unit which defendant rented. At 7:40 a.m. defendant 
signed another consent form authorizing a generalized search of 
the storage unit. Defendant fully understood the three 
consents before signing. His own testimony indicated that he 
was not compelled or coerced to sign. There is a conflict in 
the evidence whether an officer suggested that defendant's 
failure to cooperate and sign the consent would not ultimately 
prohibit a search. The court specifically finds that an 
officer made that suggestion but that it was not Agent Swehla. 
It was Swehla, however, who was in charge of acquiring these 
consents. It should be noted that the consents were signed 
75-85 minutes following entry and after defendant dressed, 
called his employer, was treated by the paramedics and informed 
of his constitutional right to counsel and right to remain 
silent. 
Between approximately 8:30 and 9:30 a.m., an officer again 
informed defendant of his rights under the Miranda decision. 
At 11:00 a.m. defendant accompanied the officers to the storage 
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unit and the defendant again signed a general consent to search 
the storage unit at 11:29 a.m. ATF Agent Conner went over the 
consent form with defendant point by point before he signed the 
form. Defendant understood the consent and testified himself 
that his signature was not coerced. He also understood that 
the form was similar to that which he previously signed for 
Agent Swehla. 
While the search of the storage unit proceeded at about 
12:30 or 1:00 p.m., ATF Agent Swehla invited defendant into a 
mobile command unit to talk. It was at this time defendant 
made the statements which he now seeks to suppress. Defendant 
was not given any further warnings of his right to remain 
silent or right to counsel. Immediately after making the 
subject statements, defendant did invoke his right to counsel. 
The questioning then ceased. 
Defendant was handcuffed throughout the various searches 
with the exception of a total of 20 minutes to one hour at the 
storage unit and in transit. Defendant was not formally 
arrested until 2:30 p.m. There can be no doubt, however, that 
defendant was in custody since 6:14 a.m. 
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II. SEARCH WARRANT 
This court's obligation in reviewing the search warrant is 
merely to insure the Magistrate had an appropriate basis for 
determining that probable cause existed for the issuance of the 
warrant. In conducting this review, the court should render 
great deference to the Magistrate's determination. The 
Magistrate's decision is not a theoretical or technical one but 
instead a practical, common sense determination considering the 
totality of the circumstances specified in the affidavit. It 
is the Magistrate's obligation to determine whether there is a 
fair probability that contraband or evidence of a crime will be 
found at the specified location. State v. Hansen, 732 P. 2d 
127, 129 (Utah 1987); State v. Miller, 740 P.2d 1363, 1365 
(Utah App. 1987); State v. Strombera. 783 P.2d 54, 56, 57 (Utah 
App. 1989). 
In reviewing the affidavit presented to Magistrate Boyce, 
it can be fairly inferred that the defendant had a motivation 
to harm Mr. Cook and had demonstrated an intense interest in 
knowing Mr. Cook's comings and goings. Mr. Cook's employer had 
been the subject of a bomb threat just one day before the 
bombing in question. This information was sufficient to 
justify the Magistrate's determination that there was a fair 
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probability evidence of the crime could be located in defendant 
Thurman's apartment. 
Defendant's challenge to the search warrant is in part 
based on a claim that the factual basis recited in the 
affidavit is stale. Most all of the cases addressing the 
question of staleness approach it from the perspective of 
whether there is a sufficient showing that the evidence can 
still be located at the site to be searched. See, State v. 
Hansen, supra; State v. Strombercr. supra; State v. Anderton, 
668 P.2d 1258 (Utah 1983). In this case, however, the 
challenge of staleness is not directed at the fruits of the 
search but instead at the underlying justification for the 
search. Merely because much of the information recited in the 
supporting affidavit disclosed matters occurring months before 
is of no great significance. Such facts were for the purpose 
of showing that defendant had motive and opportunity to commit 
the crime and that his apartment was thus an appropriate place 
to search. The alleged stale allegations were not for the 
purpose of suggesting that evidence of the crime could still be 
located at the apartment. 
As noted, the allegedly stale facts were acted upon by law 
enforcement within days after the facts came to their 
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attention* Moreover, law enforcement acted with some dispatch 
after the May 15 bombing to effect the search. The warrant was 
issued one day after the incident and executed within 15 
minutes of the earliest time authorized by the warrant itself. 
The affidavit supporting the warrant suggested the likelihood 
that relevant evidence would still be in the apartment. 
(Affidavit of Roderic J. Conner, paras. 14, 16). As a 
consequence, the alleged staleness of information does not 
suggest the search would be fruitless and does not thereby 
undermine the probable cause upon which the warrant was based. 
The propriety of the search warrant, however, does not 
offer absolute sanctuary for the manner in which it was 
executed. The evidence establishes that the warrant was 
executed as if it was a "no-knock" warrant even though 
Magistrate Boyce did not authorize such a warrant. As a 
practical matter, the officers made a mere perfunctory knock 
and seconds later made a forced entry. It was only upon entry 
that the officers announced their identity and purpose. There 
was not only insufficient compliance with Section 77-23-10(1), 
Utah Code Ann., requiring notice of authority and purpose, 
there was not even an attempt by the officers to announce their 
identity and purpose before forcing entry. 
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It appears that the officers took it upon themselves to 
execute the lawful warrant in an unlawful manner. While the 
officers may well have had concern for their own safety, 
Magistrate Boyce considered such concerns expressed in the 
affidavit of Agent Conner but rejected them by not authorizing 
the requested "no-knockfl warrant. (Affidavit of Agent Conner, 
paras. 17 and 18). 
Having determined that the search warrant was lawful but 
the manner of its execution unlawful, it is necessary for this 
court to determine the consequences of the latter. If the 
search of the apartment pursuant to the warrant had produced 
relevant evidence, one decision of the Utah Court of Appeals 
would justify suppression of the evidence. State v. Rowe, 806 
P.2d 730 (Utah App. 1991). In this particular case, however, 
the search of the apartment was fruitless. Relevant evidence 
was acquired only from a search of the storage area for which 
there was a purported consent but no warrant. This court then 
must analyze the consequences of the unlawful execution of a 
lawful search warrant in the context of the consents to search 
the storage area rather than in the context of the lawful 
issuance of the warrant itself. 
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>NSENTS T O SEARCH 
Because the evidence sought t, be suppressed did ••* result 
from the search authorized by the wrirvvmt, tin- St, as the 
burden -^ H convincing evidence that the 
consents search which yielded the subject evidence were 
knowingly and voluntarily granted, -._ whether the 
f>^e court must consider generally the 
totality of the circumstances and specifically certain factors 
specified by the Utah Supreme Court, State v. Whittenback. 621 
P.2d ) . 
There can ; c: little doubt that from the perspective ot e 
defendant, chaos reigned I i i.l ',,1 I. • following the forced 
entry by six officers with guns drawn. Within J ?; minutes, 
however, things began to calm. - / : ± D a.m I ost an 
hour had passed si^ h ^ defendant had been 
treated by paramedics, was clothed and had called his 
employer. What is most persuasive lowever, estimony 
of both defendant a::i Jd A• 3• = 1 t S1 > • e ] iRt f<=> minutes before 
defendant first consented search of the storage unit, 
Agent Swehl< identical consent t um 1 to 
defendant. clear and unequivocal 
and the court has found from the totality :f the circumstances 
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that defendant understood the consent. Defendant himself 
testified he was not coerced. The court concludes that the 
State has met its burden of proving that the first consent to 
search the storage unit was knowingly and voluntarily granted. 
In drawing this conclusion, the court considered the 
totality of the circumstances, including the specific factors 
referenced in State v. Whittenback, the activities of the hour 
preceding the consent and such factors as a continuously 
shackled defendant. Additionally, the statement of an officer 
not directly involved in acquiring the consent suggesting that 
a search was inevitable did not vitiate the voluntariness of 
the consent. This statement is but a piece of evidence to be 
considered in the totality. Furthermore, given this court's 
review of Magistrate Boyce's search warrant, the statement was 
true. See State v. Bobo, 803 P.2d 1268, 1274, n.7 (Utah App. 
1990). 
The same factors and evidence apply to the second consent 
to search the storage unit which was granted at 11:29 a.m. At 
the time of the second consent, however, the chaos of the 
initial entry was over six hours distant, defendant had been 
informed of his Miranda rights a second time and Agent Conner 
reviewed anew each item on the consent form. The court 
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therefore concludes from * :nces that 
tl,'1 Male lias met Its burden of proof that the second consent 
to search the storage ;. : ,. knowingly and voluntar i 1 , 
granted. ±n& c in, lusion after fully 
considerina that- t lefendant was essentially shackled for six 
hours at \* signed the second consent form 
storage unit. 
The Utah Supreme Court decision in State v. Arroyo, 796 
P. 2d 684 (Utah 1990) requires this court 
whether fithn mi1 cut u ,v, nuLcuneu by exploitation 
initial unlawful entry. The same evidence which persuaded this 
court that each consent was knowingly and 
equally l""il independent I y persuades this .tur that the 
officers did not exploit the initial unlawfu — • - The 
circumstances r passage OJ. time firQt 
conse ^  the second consent purged each 
consents from the taint of the unauthorized "no-knock" entry. 
The officers did nothing to harken t ' u ,,|.| ,<f ,...d did 
unnecessary show ^ force not otherwise 
implici their presence. Focusing solely on the second 
consent in search the storage unit in |»(issaye of time proved 
antiseptic, cleansing the second consent of any 
taint from the unlawful "no-knock" entry. 
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IV. DEFENDANT'S STATEMENTS AND PROLONGED DETENTION 
Defendant claims that he should have been given his Miranda 
warnings anew just prior to Agent Swehla's questioning which 
began about 12:30 or 1:00 p.m. Defendant was told of his 
rights two times, the last occurring about four hours before 
the questioning but over two hours after the initial entry. 
These warnings remained sufficiently prominent to defendant 
that he interrupted the questioning and invoked his right to 
counsel. Furthermore, the same evidence supporting the 
voluntariness of the second consent to search the storage area 
similarly establishes that defendant's statements were not the 
product of the initial, unlawful entry. The court thus 
concludes that the State has met its burden in establishing 
that defendant's statements were knowingly and voluntarily made. 
Defendant's final claim is that defendant's prolonged 
detention constituted an arrest without probable cause. This 
court has found that defendant was seized in the sense that 
from and after 6:14 a.m. he was not free to leave. 
Correspondingly, the court's determination that the search 
warrant was premised on facts establishing a fair probability 
that evidence of the crime would be found necessarily means 
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tha thp officers had an articulable suspicion that defendant 
was responsible for the bombing. The officer111™" were thus 
justified t unti1 al1 searches were 
complete. Defendant's pre-arrest detention, then, while 
lengthy, was justified. 
CONCLUSION 
For the foregoing reasons, defendant oppress 
is den ji 
Dated this / day of October, 1991. 
MICHAEL R. MURPHY " St' 
DISTRICT COURT JUDGE 
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APPENDIX B 
AFFIDAVIT OF BUREAU OF ALCOHOL, TOBACCO. AND FIREARMS 
SPECIAL AGENT. RQDERIC J, CONNER. 
X, Roderic J. Conner, Special Agent with the Bureau __ 
Alcohol, Tobacco, and Firearms (ATF), having been duiv sworn, 
depose and say: 
3 I have been a Special Agent with ATF since September 24, 
1989. That as a result of my employment with ATF I have 
successfully completed the required training courses at the Federal 
Law Enforcement Training Center in Glynco, Georgia. That during 
my employment I am familiar with the Federal Firearms and Explosive 
laws and have conducted prior investigations concluding in the 
conviction of defendants. That prior to my employment with ATF I 
was a police officer with the West Linn, Oregon, Police Department 
for six and one half years. 
2. That on May 14, 1991, at about 8:20 a.m. Debbi Hale, a 
receptionist at Metz Bakery, while at work received a "bomb threat" 
telephone call in which the male caller said to "evacuate 
immediately, there1 s a bomb in the back of one of the trucks, this 
isn't a joke" and then hung up the phone. Salt Lake County 
Sheriff's Deputies assisted the Metz Bakery management by checking 
the Metz premises. A bomb or explosive device was not discovered. 
That on May 15, 1991, at approximately 9:35 p.m. a pipe 
bomb exploded inside a 1985 Toyota Landcruiser owned by Howard 
Cook. The vehicle was parked in front of the Richard Craig 
residence, 5740 South 665 West, Murray, Utah. At the time of the 
explosion the vehicle was occupied by the eleven year old son of 
Howard Cook, Adam Cook. Adam Cook sustained serious injuries to 
his head, in fact, a AA size battery was lodged behind Adam's eye 
requiring emergency surgery to save his life. 
4. ^*^w wn nay x6, 1993^ Detective Jeff Anderson (Murray, 
Utah, Police Department) and I interviewed Howard Cook at the 
University of Utah Hospital Emergency Room regarding the bombing. 
Mr. Cook was asked about his day's activities and told his us his 
schedule for May 1991. Mr. Cook said that he went to work at 
Metz Bakery at approximately 6:00 a.m. He was at work until 4:00 
p.m. He believed that his car was locked and parked in the Metz 
Bakery parking lot the entire day. After work, Mr. Cook said that 
he went to his residence and worked in his yard until approximately 
5:50 p.m. At that time, Mr. Cook said that he went to his ex-
wife^ home (approx. 2700 East 4300 South) to pick up his two sons, 
Geoffery and Adam, to spend the evening with him. After leaving 
his ex-wife's home they went to Wendy's Hamburgers (approx. 5900 
South State) and ordered their meal through the drive-up window. 
Mr. Cook said that he then took Adam to Boy Scouts at Viewmont 
Elementary School (approx 5700 South 720 West) . Mr Cook was asked 
by the Scout Master to go down by the Jordan River to see if there 
was another boy scout from the Troop that might have received wrong 
information about the meeting. Mr. Cook and his son, Geoffery, 
went down to the river but were unable to locate the other scout. 
They then went to the Richard Craig residence (5740 South 665 West) 
at approximately 7:30 p.m. as was his normal activity on Wednesday 
nights while waiting for Adam to return from his Boy Scout meeting. 
Mr. Cook said that he left the Landcruiser unlocked in front of 
the Craig residence and took the keys inside with him. Mr. Cook 
said that he remained at the Craig's until Adam returned from Boy 
Scouts. When Adam arrived at the Craig1 s, Mr. Cook and Geoffery 
began to prepare to leave. While they were in the house Adam ran 
out to the Landcruiser to wait for them. Mr. Cook was at the front 
door when he saw Adam get in the front driver1 s side of the 
vehicle. Mr. Cook said that he saw the driver1 s side door open, 
a few seconds later he heard the horn and a "split second" later 
the bomb exploded. 
5. Mr. Cook described the explosion by saying that he saw 
a bright white light and heard a "huge" explosion. He looked 
outside and saw Adam hunched over the front seat of the vehicle. 
6. Mr. Cook was asked if there was anyone who would want to 
do him harm. Mr. Cook said that he had been having an affair with 
Wendy Thurman who worked with him at Metz1 Bakery. Mr. Cook said 
that he had continued his relationship with Wendy after she got a 
divorce and had even spent the night of May 13, 1991, at Wendy1 s 
residence. Mr. Cook said that Wendy's ex-husband, Steve Thurman, 
knew of their affair; however, the affair was not the cause of the 
divorce. 
7. Mr. Cook said that Steve Thurman drives an early 1980's 
Chevrolet Monza, cream or beige in color, with a square back. Jeff 
Anderson conducted a search of the Utah Motor Vehicle Registration 
record for Steve Thurman and found that he had registered a 1975 
Chevrolet Monza with license plate # THURM. 
8. On May 16, 1991, Jeff Anderson and I interviewed Marian 
Cook, Howard Cook's ex-wife. Ms. Cook said that the affair between 
Howard and Wendy was a contributing factor to their divorce in 
January. Ms. Cook said that she had been called by Steve Thurman. 
She said that Thurman had told her that Howard and Wendy were 
having an affair and he wanted to know if Marian was going to kick 
Howard out of the house. 
9. On May 16, 1991, Jeff Anderson and I interviewed Wendy 
Thurman. She said that Steve would not talk to her after the 
divorce and had not made any threats against her. Wendy said that 
she and Howard came to her house at about 1:30 a.m. after a date 
several months ago and saw Steve Thurman in his car parked near the 
apartment watching them. Wendy said that Steve's father had 
committed suicide several years ago and his mother had terminal 
cancer. Wendy also said that Steve had been laid off from his job 
at Hercules a few months ago and he was having problems finding a 
job. 
10. On May 16, 1991
 r Jeff Anderson and I interviewed Linda 
Mae Bird, the Aunt of Wendy Thurman, who said that she had received 
a telephone call from Steve Thurman about six months ago and he 
told her he had hired a private investigator to watch Howard and 
Wendy. Mrs. Bird said that Steve was extremely angry at Wendy 
because of the divorce and said that he hates Wendy for it. Mrs. 
Bird said that Steve knew where Howard parked his Landcruiser when 
he was visiting Wendy at her residence and he had photos of them 
together. 
11. On May 16, 1991, Jeff Anderson and I contacted the 
managers office at the Tanglewood Apartments and determined that 
Steve Thurman was renting their apartment at 3843 West 3500 South, 
Apartment "H", and he had been the sole occupant of that apartment 
since last year. 
12. On May 16, 1991, Detective Hall of Murray, Utah Police 
who told me that he interviewed Diane Burbidge who is a neighbor 
of the Craig's. She said that she saw a small 2 door vehicle 
leaving the area Eastbound at a high rate of speed with its lights 
out. I 
13. On May 16, 1991, Jerry Taylor, ATF Explosives Enforcement 
Officer examined the remains of the device recovered from in and 
around the Toyota Landcruiser and determined that the device 
consisted of batteries, remote control receiver, a servo-mechanism 
that was modified to serve as a switch, a cardboard box which 
concealed a pipe bomb that was wrapped with nails. 
14. Based on my experience, knowledge, and training, I have 
found that individuals that manufacture and or position improvised 
bombs have these components and materials to construct improvised 
bombs in their residence, vehicles, workshops, or garage. The 
materials include: receipts for bomb components, actual components 
such as batteries, explosives, pipe bomb parts, tape, books, video 
tapes or manuals describing the assembly of improvised bombs, tools 
used to manufacture improvised bombs, and items described in 
paragraph 13 of this affidavit. 
15. Based on my experience, knowledge, and training, I have 
reason to believe that Steve Thurman has and is currently violating 
firearms laws, to wit: 26 U.S.C. § 5861(d) POSSESSION OF 
UNREGISTERED DESTRUCTIVE DEVICES, and these offenses have been and 
are being committed on the property and dwelling specifically 
described as 3843 Rockwood Way #H, West Valley City, Utah, and 
within the Central Division of the District of Utah, and in a 
vehicle registered to Steve Thurman which is described as a 1975 
Chevrolet Monza, Utah license #THURM. 
16. Also based upon my experience, knowledge, and training, 
I have reason to believe that on the property described in 
paragraphs 13 and 14 of this affidavit there will be found property 
that constitutes evidence or commission of a crime; fruits of crime 
or things otherwise criminally possessed; property designed or 
intended for use or which is or has been used as a means of 
committing a criminal offense, to wit: items mentioned in 
paragraphs 13 and 14 of this affidavit. 
17. Also based upon my experience, knowledge, and training, 
those individuals required to execute a warrant involving the 
search of explosives and their precursor materials will be in 
danger if Agents and Officers are required to announce their 
authority and purpose before executing this warrant as required by 
18 U.S.C. § 3109. Authority is therefore sought from this Court 
to break open any outer or inner doors or windows without giving 
notice of authority on the properties described in paragraph 15 of 
this affidavit in order to execute this search warrant. 
18. Finally, based upon my experience, knowledge, and 
training, the materials are hazardous to public safety, a threat 
to residents in the adjoining area, and the possibility that the 
suspect has animosity towards other victims possibly designated as 
targets of additional bombings. Authority is therefore sought from 
this Court to execute this warrant at any time in the day or night. 
DATED this day of May, 1991. 
Roderic J. Conner, Special Agent 
BATF 
SUBSCRIBED AND SWORN TO BEFORE ME THIS day of May, 1991. 
RONALD N. BOYCE 
United States Magistrate Judge 
APPROVED: 
MARK K. VINCENT, Special 
Assistant U.S. Attorney 
^Inilzb J5>iai£5 ^ t s i r t r i QJmiri 
rPNTPRT. nTVTSTON DISTRICT OF U T A H 
In the Matter of the Search of 
(Nam*, aoarm or orw( dascnouon of pcraon or prewiy to M Mtrcrwsi 
The property of 3843 West 3500 South #H SEARCH WARRANT 
West Valley City, Utah, and 
The property of a 1975 Chevrolet Monza CASE NUMBER: 
with Utah: license plate #Thurm. 
TO: Poffo-rir J . Conner and any Authorized Officer of the United States 
Affidavit(s) having been made before me by s»A, Ropder^c J . Conner who has reason to 
believe that Q on the person of or Q on the premises known as <n*me. Description *nafor location* 
3843 West 3500 South #H 
West Valley City, Utah 
and 
1975 Chevrolet Monza with Utah license #THURM. 
in the CENTRAL DIVISION District of U T A H there is now 
concealed a certain person or property, namely (describe the oersoncr property) 
See Attachment "A", which is attached hereto and incorporated herein bv re£< 
I am satisfied that the affidavit(s) and any recorded testimony establish probable cause to believe that the person 
or property so described is now concealed on the person or premises above-described and establish grounds for 
/ the issuance of.this warrant. 
7 YOU ARE HEREBY COMMANDED to search on or before May 2 3 , 1991 
Date 
¥ (not to exceed 10 days) the person or place named above for the person or property specified, serving this warrant • 
^ and making the search jfojgfece^^ (at any time in the day or night as ! find 
' reasonable cause has been established) and if the person or property be found there to seize same, leaving a copy 
of this warrant and receipt for the person or property taken, and prepare a written inventory of the person or prop-
yl erty seized and promptly return this warrant to PONALD N- BOYCE 
as required by law. u.s.juoQe©rM«9,»tr«tt 
fa //77 
.. . . , , n n 7 &• "' ' 'P777 at S a l t Kake C i t y . Utah 
0M lnaJfthtB isfeCea * City ana Slate 
V 
Pnn*1H N, Bovr-g . US Magistrate Judge 
Name ana Title of Judicial Officer 'Signature ' ignature of Judicial Officer 
ATTACHMENT A 
Explosive materials, that is, gunpowder, model rocket igniters or 
motors, and commercial packaging for the explosive materials. Receipts 
or other documents related to the purchase of the explosive materials; 
tools, pipe nipples, pipe end caps, electrical wiring and connectors, 
packaging or duct tape and sundry items used in the fabrication of a 
destructive device. Bomb components to include batteries, switches, 
remote control receiver and transmitter, servo mechanism, nails, 
cardboard box and receipts for these items. Drawings, books, manuals, 
video tapes, diagrams or other forms of instructions relating to the 
fabrication of destructive devices. Photographs of destructive devices, 
their components, and the process involved in the manufacture of bombs. 
Equipment to be used for the manufacturing of components for destructive 
devices. Partially assembled or assembled destructive devices. Any 
documentation or information pertaining to the storage, possession, 
and/or manufacturing of destructive devices. 
APPENDIX C 
CONSENT TO SEARCH PREMISES 
J L o c a t i o n ]Date , T ] 
j ^T»*+<~A ^^rr j?// ] 5A7/f/ 1 
] / / / £ rf^&xJ ]Time ] 
j **it0t/+L£j err**/' 1 /A'27f4w 1 
I, ^T&V&O l^ ou t^ArS "TVwie^ AO
 y having been informed of my 
constitutional right not to have a search made of the 
premises described below without a search warrant, and 
of my right to refuse to consent to such a search, hereby 
authorize 
^ACrr~ <U*^S> €Z^u^r^ £^4A 4^T-> 
(Titles and Names of Agents) 
to conduct a complete search of my premises located at 
(Address of Premises to be Searcnea) 
and consisting of ^7Yl/*J Jf Cf&t/ C3a / 7*^ -r^* cA^T* 
, ^ „ (General Description or Property) 
I understand that I am not under arrest and I understand 
that I can revoke th i s consent at anytime before the 
search has been completed. I also understand that any 
incriminating evidence that may be found during this 
search may be used
 %against me in court or other proceedings. 
The agents named above have informed me that their reason 
for wishing to search these premises i s £~**~ &\j>o&*cA c {* 
This written permission i s being given by me to the above-
named agents voluntarily. I have not been threatened 
either by word or action and no promises of any sort 
have been made to me. 
f-/7-«r 
orizmg Signature Date 
ST-'**' 
Dare 
UJN&JS.Nr TU SEARCH PREMISES 
J Location 
#/* 1 D a t e / /,* ] 
]Time ] 
1 £7*^ 1 
I, , having been informed of my 
constitutional right not to have a search made of the 
premises described below without a search warrant, and 
of my right to refuse to consent to such a search, hereby 
authorize 
(Titles and Names of Agents) 
to conduct a complete search of my premises located at 
(Address of Premises to be Searched) 
and consisting of /£ /Le_^r~/*L- /JAJJT £ ~/f LSKJKJZ^ L^/^SJEJ ^§°*1 
(General Description of Property) s/*u*£ /iosr^STC^ 
I understand that I am not under arrest and I understand 
that I can revoke this consent at anytime before the 
search has been completed. I also understand that any 
incriminating evidence that may be found during this 
search may be used .against me in court or other proceedings. 
The agents named above have informed me that their reason 
for wishing to search these premises is 7~Q ^ac^^r^L 
/>tf?Z-r?j!U2 0U£ jEvLpLQZ/uJF 'S44Qr£vUALX. /?X//3 / ^ / C ArujCi&S 
This written permission is being given by me to the above-
named agents voluntarily. I have not been threatened 
either by word or action and no promises of any sort 
have been made to me. 
n 
Cl**-K^ 'Uslsinn^-
A u t h o r i z m g S i g n a t u r e 
3V7-9 
Date L 
Witness 
£~-/7-?/ 
Date 
